Salvage Operations By Non-Professional Salvors: A Practical Guide for Ship Masters

(Presented at the International Towage & Salvage Convention May 2000. Written by Jim Brown, Captain Prentice "Skip" Strong III; Penobscot Bay & River Pilots and Miguel A. Quiones; SeaRiver Maritime )

Salvage Operations By Non-Professional Salvors:

A Practical Guide for Ship Masters

Synopsis:

This panel will discuss salvage operations involving nonprofessionals. Despite advances in vessel navigation systems and equipment, ship masters continue to find themselves in salvage situations. Today’s ship masters are provided (or inundated) with numerous manuals and guidelines ranging from ISM/ISO codes, medical care at sea, maintenance, safety, cargo, and job hazard analyses, to sexual harassment and human relations at sea. Are they provided with sufficient guidance should they find themselves in a situation as salvor or salvee? This paper will provide practical advice from a maritime attorney in private practice, an in-house counsel for a major tanker owner/operator, and the former Master of the S.S. CHERRY VALLEY, a Coronado-class tanker that successfully salved the valuable external fuel tank to NASA’s space shuttle by rescuing the barge transporting it from a coral reef off the Florida Keys. This resulted in what the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit deemed, "the largest maritime salvage award in recorded history." The presentation will also include photographs and graphics from the actual salvage of the space shuttle’s fuel tank.

I. Who Can Be a Salvor? (or You Can Be a Salvor)

Jim Brown - Legge, Farrow, Kimmitt & McGrath, L.L.P., Houston, Texas

There are three traditional prerequisites to a valid salvage claim: (1) success, in whole or in part, in saving a vessel, cargo, or freight; (2) from a marine peril; (3) through services rendered voluntarily and not pursuant to any preexisting duty or contract. The SABINE, 101 U.S. 384 (1880). "Maritime salvage is as old and hoary a doctrine may be found in the Anglo-American law. Since time in memorial, the mariner who acted voluntarily to save property from a peril on the high seas has been entitled to a reward. This simple rule has been an integral part of the maritime commerce in the western world since the western world was civilized." Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V JA ORGERON, 143 F.3d 976, 985 (5th Cir. 1998). Nine hundred years before the birth of Christ, the Rhodians had laws compensating the salvor of a distressed ship for his efforts. Their masters, the Romans, adopted the maritime laws, and allowed compensation to a voluntary salvor on a theory that a shipowner should not be unjustly enriched by the efforts and expenses of a salvor. Similar salvage laws are found in the Marine Ordinances Trani (1063 A.D.), the Laws of Oleron, the Code of the Hanseatic League, and the Maritime Ordinances of Louis XIV. 3A Benedict on Admiralty, § 5 (7th Ed. 1984). On land one who voluntarily rushes in and saves the property of another from a peril is an intermeddler whom equity will not aid. He has no right to a reward and may be held liable for damages suffered by the property during the rescue. Gilmore & Black at 532. At sea, one who voluntarily saves property may receive a generous salvage award, in keeping with "the fundamental public policy at the basis of the rewards of salvage -- encouragement of seamen to render prompt service in future emergencies." Kimes v. United States, 207 F.2d 60, 63 (2nd Cir. 1953).

By definition, a salvor is a person, who, without any particular relation to a ship or property in distress, performs a useful service and gives it as a volunteer without any pre-existing contract or duty. The Clarita & The Clara, 90 U.S. 1 (1874). Such cases of "pure" salvage often involve nonprofessional salvors who happen upon a vessel in distress and come to its assistance. In his treatise Modern Marine Salvage, William I. Milwee, Jr. describes such salvors as "casual salvors" who "happen upon a marine casualty or respond to a distress call. They do not make a business of salvage and maintain neither ships nor other plant for the work. They often work without a contract and pursue their claims for compensation through the courts." Millwee, Modern Marine Salvage (1st Ed. 1996).

Nonprofessional salvors have included the proverbial three men in a row boat, as in the case of The Mary Freeland, 62 F. 943 (E.D.N.Y. 1894), a visitor who happened to be on a tug which assisted another vessel and who ultimately received a share of the salvage award, The Calcium, 218 F.267 (W.D. Wash. 1914), a stranger who was mistakenly thought to be an employee of an oil company which owned a barge on fire and who aided in the barge’s rescue, J. M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Borison, 211 F.594 (5th Cir. 1914), and a former crew member of a laid up vessel serving as a day watchman living and sleeping ashore who, one night when the vessel was afire, came from his home and provided assistance, The Florida, 22 F. 617 (C.C.D. Georgia 1884). In a perfect world, every meeting of the salvor and salvee will result in a freely negotiated contract for salvage services priced at a competitive level before commencement of a job. In the real world, however, most meetings of salvor and salvee cannot be resolved in this fashion. In such cases, a ship’s Master often puts out a distress call which is answered by another mariner who comes to his aid, thinking primarily of the lives aboard the stricken vessel. The assisting vessel agrees to provide assistance and a "salvage agreement" is struck. In a land-based situation, such an agreement might fail for lack of specific terms such as duration, expenses, price, etc. However, in cases of marine salvage, the law has accommodated this reality and recognizes a post hoc solution that will induce parties to save ships without first agreeing on terms. See, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Leg. Stud. 83, 100 (1978). In order to properly induce a mariner to risk his vessel and gear in saving another, the law provides for a proper and reasonable salvage reward which may be determined after the service has been provided. Should a determination of a reasonable award be litigated, the courts will first determine if the claim is properly one of salvage, and if so, proceed to calculate the amount of the reward. In calculating the reward, U.S. courts often rely on the six traditional salvage factors first announced in The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869). The factors are, in order of original listing:

1. The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service.

2. The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the service.

3. The value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service and the danger to which it was exposed.

4. The risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from the incumbent peril.

5. The value of the property.

6. The degree of danger from which the property was rescued.

Although old, "these guidelines have weathered the storms of the past century." St. Paul Marine Transport Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp., 505 F.2d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1974).

A. Casual Salvor Extraordinaire: The SS CHERRY VALLEY and Captain Prentice "Skip" Strong, III

On June 29, 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Federal Circuit issued an opinion rendering, what it termed to be, "the largest maritime salvage award in recorded history." During a severe tropical storm off the Florida coast, the SS CHERRY VALLEY, a deeply laden oil tanker, rescued a tug and barge containing the valuable external fuel tank for NASA’s space shuttle. The court’s poignant opinion begins:

It was a dark and very stormy night, November 14-15, 1994, and the situation looked bleak for the barge POSEIDON. Caught in the clutches of tropical storm Gordon, the POSEIDON and her escort, the J.A. OREGERON was without power and adrift. Driven on the gales of the tempest, the flotilla was swiftly approaching the Bethel Shoals; if they ran aground, the ships were sure to founder and be lost. Acutely aware of the danger, ORGERON’s Captain radioed for help. Alas, the Coast Guard was not in a position to mount a rescue. In despair, the Captain made plans to release the POSEIDON and her valuable cargo, an external fuel tank for the space shuttle. Although this action would result in the certain loss of the POSEIDON and the tank the Captain hoped thereby to save ORGERON and her crew.

Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V J.A. ORGERON, 143 F.3d 976, 980 (1998). Although the ORGERON immediately notified the Coast Guard of its predicament once it lost its engines and began setting towards the shoal, due to the storm’s ferocity, the Coast Guard was unable to help. ORGERON’s distress call was picked up by the SS CHERRY VALLEY, a 688-foot oil tanker fully loaded with nine million gallons of heavy fuel oil at a draft of 35 feet. Although under no obligation to assist, the vessel’s Master, whom the Court of Appeals dubbed "the suitably named Captain Strong" immediately altered course to intercept the tug. Praising Capt. Strong, the Fifth Circuit explained: "Captain Prentice Strong, III was a graduate of the Maine Maritime Academy and had been going to sea for over ten years at the time of the events in this case. There is a substantial testament to his ability that he reached the pinnacle of his profession, Master of a large oceangoing tanker, at the remarkable youthful age of thirty-two. Given this record, we are not surprised that Captain Strong displayed exemplary seamanship throughout this incident." Margate Shipping Co., 143 F.3d at 981 n.4). In assisting, Capt. Strong took a relatively unmaneuverable craft into perilous shoal waters in direct violation of standing orders. As the court explained, the approaches to Bethel Shoal have depths far too shallow for the CHERRY VALLEY, especially when operating in heavy seas. Throughout the salvage operation, the CHERRY VALLEY’s deck would be awash with green seas and extremely dangerous for even experienced seamen. Margate Shipping Co. at 981.

On the first approach, the CHERRY VALLEY fired a messenger line using its rocket throwing apparatus. The line fell short and Captain Strong was forced to bring the ship about for another attempt. This time he passed closer to the ORGERON and the messenger line was successfully transferred. It parted, however, before the deck crew was able to transfer a mooring line. Captain Strong was compelled to bring the CHERRY VALLEY about once more. Time was now critical. During the first two attempts, the storm continued to set both vessels west toward the shoal which was now less than one mile away. The court found that if the CHERRY VALLEY ran aground, she would have likely broken up and created a massive oil spill. Aware of the danger, Captain Strong informed the ORGERON that he would make one last attempt. This third attempt was successful. During this transfer, however, the CHERRY VALLEY passed over the tow wire running between the ORGERON and its barge POSEIDON. Captain Strong held his breath waiting to see if the wire would foul the CHERRY VALLEY’s rudder or prop. It did not. At 0620 hours, the CHERRY VALLEY took the flotilla in tow. At this time, her propellor was churning up mud and the fathometer indicated less than ten feet beneath the keel. Id.

At 1100 hours, the tug SOUTH BEND arrived and attempted to assist. Due to the extreme sea and weather conditions, it was unable to pass a line to the ORGERON and feared for its own survival. The SOUTH BEND’s Master decided to retreat and while returning to port, the vessel was overcome by the seas and began to sink. The SOUTH BEND issued a Mayday call and intentionally grounded herself just outside the Fort Pierce harbor jetty to avoid total loss.

At this point, the tempest began to overcome even the CHERRY VALLEY. Because of the strain on the towing hawsers, she was unable to head directly into the wind and was being pushed westward back toward the shallows. Out of options, Captain Strong decided to anchor and ride out the rest of the storm. Although this operation exposed the deck crew to additional risks, it was accomplished without incident at 1700 hours. Margate Shipping Co. at 982. The vessels remained at anchor throughout the night of November 15 and the following day. On the evening of November 16, the tug DOROTHY MORAN arrived on the scene. She too was unable to successfully pass the line to the flotilla and returned to Fort Pierce to await daybreak and better weather. By mid morning on November 17, the storm had finally abated and the DOROTHY MORAN and another tug were able to relieve the CHERRY VALLEY of the ORGERON and POSEIDON. The POSEIDON and its valuable cargo were towed successfully to Port Canaveral unharmed. The fuel tank was later used in a successful space shuttle launch.

In addition to the Blackwall factors, the trial court considered a seventh factor, that being the risk of environmental liability incurred by the CHERRY VALLEY. A trial court ruled that Margate was entitled to a salvage award equal to 12.5% of the value of the salved property, the POSEIDON and ET-70 (the fuel tank). The court recognized that generally the value of property for salvage purposes is its market value as salved. Margate, 143 F.3d at 990. However, in the case of a unique item like a space shuttle fuel tank, this measure is clearly inapposite as there is no market for space shuttle fuel tanks. Therefore, the court looked to the replacement cost of the fuel tank and determined that if NASA had to purchase another one from the manufacturer, the total replacement cost would be approximately $31 million. To this, it added the $2 million stipulated value of the POSEIDON, for a total value of salved property of $33 million. Margate, 143 F.3d at 993 (commenting that "this admittedly rough and ready valuation" is proper as "the value of salved property need not be determined with great precision in order to calculate an appropriate award . . ."). Applying the district court’s 12.5% salvage percentage, the Fifth Circuit rendered a salvage award of $4.125 million.

II. Preparing for the Unexpected - SeaRiver Maritime Inc.

Miguel A. Quinones - House Counsel for SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., Houston, Texas

Most, if not all, vessel owner/operators do not find themselves in the position to provide salvage services to other vessels. After all, cargo vessel owners/operators are in the business of transporting cargo or personnel. Salvage services are delegated to professional salvage companies that provide that service for a living. For that reason, many vessel captains do not have specific procedures at hand to guide them in the event they have to render salvage services to another vessel. We must recognize, however, that some guidance is necessary given the fact that there may be situations where a non-professional salvor may have to salvage another vessel. For example, U.S. law provides that the Master of a U.S. flagged vessel shall render assistance to any individual found in danger of being lost if the Master can do without serious danger to the Master's or individual's vessel or individuals on board. 46 U.S.C. §2304. Therefore, it is important that non-professional salvors take some steps to minimize exposing their crew and vessels to additional risks associated with a salvage operation.

I will briefly discuss some of the guidelines and steps that SeaRiver takes to prepare our vessel officers in emergency procedures and salvage operations. I do not intend to represent that everyone in the industry must follow these guidelines and procedures. Instead, I just want to share them for your consideration.

SeaRiver's guidelines in the area of salvage can be found in its Emergency Preparedness Manual. Although the salvage guidelines address primarily a situation where a SeaRiver vessel may be in need of salvage, the guidelines are equally helpful when SeaRiver is involved as a salvor because they provide guidance which may assist the Master to minimize any risk to his crew and vessel. First of all, the Master involved in a salvage operation should review the International Chamber of Shipping booklet, Perils at Sea and Salvage - A Guide to Masters. This booklet provides guidance in the areas of communications, transfer of cargo, use of engines/tugs, etc. Second, the SeaRiver guidelines recommend that the Master give the officers of the vessel an opportunity to review the booklet as well. From my perspective, this will allow all officers to understand the nature and risks of the operation and share any ideas with the Master.

Another way to minimize the risks involved in salvage operations is through training. SeaRiver provides extensive emergency preparedness training to its officers through the use of simulators. Although the simulation scenarios do not involve a salvage operation whereby the SeaRiver vessel renders salvage services to another vessel, they are intended to enhance the officers' awareness and skills in the event of an emergency.

Finally, SeaRiver maintains an in-house team with expertise in vessel casualty issues, including salvage operations. In fact, this "casualty response" team will also coordinate salvage operations when one of our vessel is receiving salvage assistance. This team is comprised of several individuals, including a salvage Master, a naval architect, a repair superintendent, and support staff. While certain members of the team are involved in the investigation of the casualty, other members of the team coordinate and direct the casualty response operations. These individuals are in direct communication with the U.S. Coast Guard and local authorities to gather resources necessary to successfully salvage the vessel, such as divers, tugs, lightering vessels, etc. Both aspects of the casualty team (investigation and response) coordinate their efforts to minimize any disruptions in the salvage operation.

Obviously, this team is not intended to provide commercial salvage services to third parties. However, their expertise could greatly assist one of our vessel Masters who may be rendering salvage to another vessel. The salvage Master has several reference materials to guide him during a salvage operation. The salvage Master will refer to the Perils at Sea and Salvage - A Guide to Masters booklet for guidance. SeaRiver's salvage Master also refers to the U.S. Navy Salvor's Handbook, which provides information such as proper rigging, the development of a salvage plan, the use of rigging, patching techniques, etc.

In terms of legal advice, we routinely remind our ocean-going Masters of the general obligation that a vessel master has under U.S. law to provide assistance to other vessels in distress at sea. It is clearly within a vessel Master's purview to assess what type or level of assistance he/she can render to the vessel in distress. The main area of inquiry will be whether the Master can perform the salvage operation without risking his vessel and crew. This is the area of greatest concern from a liability standpoint. To that extent, I advise vessel Masters in our audience to consider and review the guidelines under Chapter 4 through Chapter 8 of the Perils at Sea booklet and the U.S. Navy Salvor's Handbook or any other similar materials whenever involved in a salvage situation. By doing so, a non-professional salvor should be able to prove that it took reasonable steps to minimize any risks to its crew and vessel.

III. S/S CHERRY VALLEY TO THE RESCUE

Captain Prentice "Skip" Strong, III of the M/V CHERRY VALLEY

On November 14, 1994, Captain Strong had no idea that his vessel would soon, single handily, save a $31 million fuel tank for NASA’s space shuttle, as well as the lives of the crew towing it. As it turned out, due to the exemplary seamanship exhibited by Captain Strong and his crew, the effort was successful. However, the salvage operation required that he bring his vessel into perilous shoal waters. Had the vessel run aground and broken up, Captain Strong faced the possible loss of his career, and even criminal prosecution. What kind of training and directives had he received with regard to salvage operations, and how can the traditional vessel owner/operator prepare its master for similar unexpected salvage situations?

IV. My Brief Career as a Salvor

A. Dark and Stormy Night . . .

On October 24, 1994, I started my second trip as Master aboard the SS CHERRY VALLEY. The CHERRY VALLEY is a 40,000 DWT T-6 class tanker built by Nasco in 1974 and operated by Keystone Shipping Company of Bala Cynwyd, PA. She is 688' in length, 90' in beam, and had a deep draft of 35'.

The CHERRY VALLEY rounded Key West on the morning of November 14 loaded with 37,661 metric tons on No. 6 fuel oil. Under normal circumstances, we would have proceeded north, off the coast of Florida in the Gulf Stream to take advantage of its approximate three knot following current. However, due to the proximity of Tropical Storm Gordon, I altered our track to the west, taking the vessel closer to the coast so as to avoid the generally higher seas existing in the Gulf Stream.

During our voyage toward Jacksonville, the CHERRY VALLEY received regular marine forecasts and tropical weather outlooks from the National Weather Service and N.O.A.A. vhf weather broadcasts. The Vessel’s Radio Operator closely monitored this information and kept me fully advised of Gordon’s progress and the existence of gale and tropical storm warnings along our intended track up the east coast of Florida.

As we neared the southern tip of Florida, we were encountering winds from the north-northeast at 20 to 25 knots with seas in the eight to 10 foot range. Shortly before noon the severity of the weather necessitated the closing of the main deck doors and restriction of all hands inside. Conditions worsened during the late evening of November 14 and the early morning of November 15, as we came out of the lee of the Bahamas Bank. The winds shifted to the east-northeast at sustained speeds of 35 to 40 knots. The seas grew to 15 to 20 feet.

At about 0120 on November 15, I was called by the watch officer, Second Mate James Kuijper, who reported that he had intercepted a distress call over the vhf from a tug and tow requesting urgent assistance. This was followed by a "pan-pan" call from the Coast Guard Station at Fort Pierce relaying the distress call from the J.A. ORGERON, the distressed tug, and giving her latest reported position which we determined to be about three hours steaming time to the north-northwest.

I quickly proceeded to the bridge after receiving the Second Mate’s call. When I entered the pilot house, the Second Mate was communicating with the Coast Guard, advising them of our position and course. The tug’s initial reported position was about 9 miles east of Bethel Shoal. After calculating an approximate 0400 intercept time, I directed the Second Mate to inform the Coast Guard of our estimated time of arrival in the vicinity of the ORGERON and her tow and that we would see what we could do to render assistance. I also instructed the Second Mate to tell the Coast Guard that we were a 688-foot tanker and not suitable for rescue operations, and recommended that the Coast Guard should determine if there were any other vessels more suitable to assist. I was advised by the Second Mate that there was apparently no other vessels in the area that could assist the disabled tug. The Second Mate advised the Coast Guard that we would continue on our course toward the ORGERON.

I returned to my stateroom after instructing the Second Mate to call me again at 0300. However, unable to sleep, I returned to the bridge at about 0220. Shortly after I went back to the bridge, I had my first radio conversation with Captain Lanny Wiles, master of the tug ORGERON. Captain Wiles reported that the ORGERON had suffered a reduction gear casualty that had put his port propeller shaft out of commission. His starboard engine had lost four out of the eight cylinders and was barely able to keep her head into the seas. Additionally, diesel fuel was pumped directly into the exhaust manifold of the starboard engine and as the temperature of the manifold reached the auto ignition temperature of the diesel they were experiencing fires and explosions in the engine room and were only able to operate that engine intermittently. (We later learned that earlier in the voyage the jockey arm for the port rudder had broken and they were down to one rudder.) With her severely restricted engine capability, ORGERON was unable to maintain her position and Captain Wiles estimated that she and her tow were drifting westward, toward the shore, at a rate of about 2.5 knots. He also told me that his tow, the unmanned barge POSEIDON, was carrying cargo that was being transported from a NASA facility near New Orleans to Port Canaveral. After we had finally connected the tow lines to the ORGERON I was told by Captain Wiles that POSEIDON’s cargo was an external fuel tank for NASA’s space shuttle.

At 0240, I ordered our course changed from 000 degrees to 340 degrees to put us on an intercept course with ORGERON. At about 0300 I contacted the Coast Guard and Captain Wiles to ask specifically what they wanted us to do. Both responded by asking that we render any assistance possible. To ensure an intercept time of about 0400, I ordered our speed increased, at 0303, from 70 rpm to 75 rpm.

At about 0330, we acquired ORGERON and POSEIDON, at a range of about 8 miles, on our 10 cm radar. A short while later, after a squall cleared, I was able to see the glow of illumination given off by ORGERON’s deck lights. Upon visually identifying the tug, we were able to alter our course more to the west to intercept.

At about 0340, I acquired and designated POSEIDON, which was a much larger target than ORGERON, as a target on the ARPA which was working off the 10 cm radar. The course and speed read-out on the barge confirmed Captain Wiles’ calculation that the tug and barge were drifting roughly westward at a rate of about 2.5 knots. At their present rate of drift they would be over Bethel Shoal in less than three hours and then we would be unable to assist them.

I called Captain Wiles to advise him that we were going to see what we could do to assist him and requested additional information on the status of the tug and tow. Captain Wiles stated that ORGERON and POSEIDON were both heading roughly southeast with the barge riding astern of the tug. ORGERON had fallen off into the trough and was taking the seas directly on her beam. It was apparent that she no longer had sufficient engine power to keep her head into the seas. ORGERON had about 1500 feet of wire out to the barge, but as we were operating in less than 20 fathoms of water the majority of the wire was on the bottom. We had discussed the various options which were available including anchoring the tug and barge (using the tugs anchor), putting a crew member from the tug onboard the barge and then anchoring the barge, releasing the barge and concentrating on the tug and crew, or towing both the tug and barge away from the coast. I decided to attempt to tow both vessels.

Carl Garbrielsson, my Chief Mate, came up to the bridge at 0345 to relieve the Second Mate and assume the 0400 to 0800 watch. I quickly briefed him on the situation and outlined the plan for staging a rescue operation. My initial intention was to approach the tug and barge from the south-southeast on a north-northwesterly course. While still to the south of ORGERON, we would turn into the seas, creating a lee for the tug as we passed her on our port quarter. ORGERON was advised of this plan and orders were given to awaken the deck department in preparation for our anticipated rescue operation. The third Mate, Cristos Sotirelis, was called to the bridge to relieve the Second Mate and free the Chief Mate for other duties. The Chief Mate left the bridge immediately to assemble the deck department and to supervise the breaking out of mooring lines and other gear needed to take ORGERON under tow. Upon the Third Mate’s arrival at 0405, the Second Mate left the pilot house to break out our line throwing apparatus and messenger line, both of which were stowed on the flying bridge.

The only mooring lines we had access to were stored on the top of the inert gas house, located on the stern. The standard mooring lines that we carried were 720’ eight braid poly-dacron with a new breaking strength of 137,000 pounds. These lines were old and had been retired from service and were due to be disposed of. Our good lines were stowed in the lazarette that was accessed through a small hatch in the main deck. The lines were stored next to the steering gear compartment and with seas coming on deck I could not risk getting saltwater on the electric motors used to power the steering gear

At the same time, the First Assistant Engineer, Paul Donnelly, who had just arrived in the engine room for the 0400 to 0800 watch, was told to make all necessary preparations to answer maneuvering bells. He was instructed to keep the Second Assistant Engineer, Ronald Spencer, in the engine room to assist with the expected maneuvering. The Chief Engineer, Timothy Croke, was also called to the engine room.

As we drew closer to the ORGERON, I could see that the tug was apparently dead in the water as she and her tow were pitching and rolling independently in the heavy seas. I was also having second thoughts about my initial approach on the disabled tug since it would entail taking the CHERRY VALLEY directly toward Bethel Shoal and then turning into the wind to move away from the shoal. Soundings around Bethel Shoal were in the range of 28 to 30 feet. As we were drawing almost 35 feet, I could not accept the clear risk such a maneuver would involve.

I was maintaining vhf radio communication with Captain Wiles, the Coast Guard Station at Fort Pierce and with the Chief Mate and Second Mate, who were carrying uhf radios, and advised all concerned that I was altering my approach plan. At 0408, I commenced a modified "Williamson" turn to port and at 0431 we were directly to windward of the tug. From this position, I assessed the effect of the existing wind and sea conditions on the tug and barge and considered my options in making an approach on the tug.

The weather conditions remained bad with sustained winds of 35 to 40 knots blowing from the east northeast with higher gusts. Heavy squalls were passing through the area and the seas were approaching 20 feet. The seas were breaking and washing over the main deck whenever we took them on our beam.

The Radio Officer had come to the bridge shortly before we had commenced our first approach to on ORGERON. While the Third Mate monitored ORGERON’s drift rate through the use of the ARPA, and kept track of the Vessel’s position, Mr. Worden kept me continuously advised of our own position as displayed on the GPS. ORGERON was constantly drifting westward and so, consequently, was the CHERRY VALLEY as we tried to maneuver alongside the disabled tug. I was very concerned about our close proximity to Bethel Shoal and the sixty foot curve just to our west and decided that under no circumstances could I allow the CHERRY VALLEY to cross the line of 80 degrees 10 minutes west longitude. Following this decision, Mr. Worden began passing me only our longitude.

As we began this approach, I wanted to pass ORGERON about 150 to 200 feet off our starboard side. The actual distance as we came abeam of the tug was closer to 200 to 250 feet. At this point, the Second Mate was standing by on the stack deck with a Paynes Wessex Schermuly rocket-fired line throwing apparatus. At the right moment, I told him to fire toward ORGERON. Unfortunately, with the low ceiling and strong winds, the line never got near the tug. In the hope that we could fire off a second rocket, I tried to stop our headway, but we had already passed the tug and were out of range.

Once it was clear that we were out of range of the ORGERON, I told the Chief Mate to get the crew off the main deck while I brought the Vessel about in the heavy seas to reposition her for another pass. Working conditions for the crew were already extremely hazardous and I saw no reason to expose them to additional peril unless it was absolutely necessary. We turned hard left to bring the Vessel’s bow through the seas and head back to the north. This was a difficult turn since we had just taken all the way off of the Vessel at the end of the first pass when I had contemplated another attempt with the line throwing apparatus.

My original thought, as we turned, was to attempt a port side approach on ORGERON as we headed north. After taking the headway off of the Vessel again the crew was able to get back on deck and reposition the gear on the port side. ORGERON was now drifting by again, about 400 to 500 feet off of our port side. Given this distance and the erratic nature of the line throwing devices, I decided against expending another of our limited line throwing devices. I advised everyone that we would make a quick turn to starboard and commence a second starboard side approach on the tug.

As we began our second approach, I used backing bells to take the way off the Vessel and attempted to steer an intercept course toward the ORGERON. We succeeded in taking her very close alongside our starboard midships in the vicinity of the cargo manifold. The Chief Mate was set up for using heaving lines from the main deck and the Second Mate was set for using the line throwing device from the stack deck, depending upon our distance off the tug. The longer of the two available messenger lines was on the stack deck with the line throwing device.

I ordered half astern, full astern and then emergency full astern to stop the Vessel as ORGERON passed down the our starboard side. The crew under the supervision of the Chief Mate successfully passed a heaving line to the ORGERON and quickly fastened the end to the considerably shorter messenger line available on the main deck which the tug’s crew began to haul onboard. By now, however, ORGERON was drifting astern of us and, before the mooring lines could be tied to the messenger, the messenger line parted.

I decided to make another approach and told the Chief Mate that we would not try to pass any lines to port on this northerly leg as we had considered doing on our last turn to the north. As we turned again into the seas, the Radio Officer and the Third Mate advised that we were continuing to lose ground to the west and that the sixty-foot curve was now about a mile away. We were running out of room in which we could safely maneuver. I advised Captain Wiles and my deck officers that this approach would be the last since we could not risk coming any closer to shoal water in the existing wind and sea conditions.

Using a combination of ahead and astern engine orders, I was able to twist the CHERRY VALLEY about for another intercept run on ORGERON. Anticipating another close quarters approach, the deck crew had brought the longer messenger line down to the main deck and waited in the lee of the deck house for the opportunity to throw their heaving lines.

The third approach on ORGERON was very similar to the second. Headed perpendicular to our starboard midships, in the vicinity of the cargo manifold again, ORGERON actually struck our side as heaving lines were passed to crew on her foredeck. I ordered full astern to stop our forward motion as ORGERON swung parallel to our side.

As ORGERON’s Captain and crew were frantically hauling our 1600 foot messenger onboard, the tug drifted very slowly aft, rolling and pitching violently in the heavy sea. Watching from the starboard bridge wing as our messenger was hauled aboard the tug, I noted the ORGERON’s tow wire was leading off her port quarter, close to the point where our screw and rudder were located. I ordered the engine stopped and the rudder held stationary to avoid any possibility that the tow wire could foul our screw and rudder and disable us in the heavy seas close to shoal water. I called Captain Wiles and asked him to use whatever engine power he might have left to back clear of our stern so that I could maneuver. Whether he merely drifted back or actually got some power from the disabled engine, a considerable amount of black smoke came out of the ORGERON’s starboard stack and the wire cleared our stern. Once ORGERON had fallen astern of us, we began to pass our mooring lines to her crew.

At about 0620, two mooring lines were secured to the bitts on the ORGERON’s foredeck. We placed our ends of the lines on two sets of bits on the fantail and took several turns. As the distance between the CHERRY VALLEY and ORGERON slowly opened, the lines were surged out to prevent them from being placed under an excessive strain. Once the lines were deployed 600 feet astern, they were secured on the bitts. Our deck crew liberally applied grease around the lines where they passed through the stern chock to prevent chafing. I ordered slow ahead at 0622 but quickly reduced speed to avoid putting a shock load on the mooring lines as we took ORGERON and POSEIDON under tow. Very gradually we increased the rpm. Although I wanted to move clear of the shoal water, I was reluctant to risk parting the tow lines by ordering any additional speed and, as a result, we made very little distance to the east. Our 0724 position put us only 0.6 miles east of the sixty-foot curve.

Initially I tried to steer a course toward the east as this was the most direct line away from shoal water. However, the direction of the seas forced us to use considerable amounts of rudder to maintain such a heading and this in turn merely cut our already reduced speed and decreased our progress away from the shore. Eventually, we settled on a course of about 145 degrees which could be generally steered with our rudder amidships. We would stay on this general course for the next ten hours, moving 11 miles to the south but only.75 miles to the east, on a course made good of about 180 degrees.

Shortly after we began towing ORGERON and POSEIDON, I made my first report of this incident to Keystone Shipping Co. and passed status reports to the Coast Guard stations at Fort Pierce and Miami who were monitoring the rescue operation. At about this time we also received our first call from Bill Knodle, the port captain at NASA’s Michoud Assembly Facility at New Orleans where the external fuel tank was assembled and placed onboard the POSEIDON for the voyage to Port Canaveral. Mr. Knodle, who had traveled to Florida to monitor this situation, stated that he was making arrangements to send another tug to our assistance. We were later informed that he had contracted the tug SOUTH BEND from Port Canaveral and that he expected her to arrive in our vicinity sometime later that morning. He was also exploring the possibility of trying to put someone aboard the barge from a helicopter to try and anchor the barge. Due to the severity of the weather and not being able to convince a pilot to fly this idea was tabled.

At 0805 we received our first radio communications from the SOUTH BEND. Her position was about 14.5 miles to the north of us. At various times throughout the morning, SOUTH BEND’s progress toward us was practically stopped as she headed into the very steep seas and high winds accompanying the severe squalls that were sweeping the area.

Although the SOUTH BEND arrived on the scene at about 1000, she made no attempt to approach the ORGERON until the period of heavy squalls ended about 1400. During my conversations with the SOUTH BEND, I learned she was smaller the ORGERON and had only a single 1600 horsepower engine and was equipped with a hawser for towing and not a towing winch. She was clearly a harbor tug and appeared to be having trouble forcing her way into the wind and seas. I did not think the SOUTH BEND was of sufficient size or horsepower to be considered suitable for working in the sea conditions existing during the afternoon of November 15.

By 1400 the worst of the squalls had passed. SOUTH BEND approached to windward of the ORGERON and passed a heaving line and a messenger line to the disabled tug. SOUTH BEND’s hawser was tied to the messenger which was then winched aboard the ORGERON. As the wire bridle attached to the hawser reached the ORGERON’s bow, the messenger line parted. At this point, the entire 1800 foot length of the SOUTH BEND’s hawser went into the water.

SOUTH BEND’s master informed me that he would have to retrieve his hawser before making another attempt at putting a line aboard the ORGERON. Consequently, the SOUTH BEND turned and ran downwind so that her crew could work on the after deck hauling in the hawser. They took about two hours to complete this process and ended up about five miles from our position.

During this time, I had communicated with the Coast Guard, Keystone and Mr. Knodle, advising them that the SOUTH BEND’s first approach had failed and that we anticipated her making a second approach once she recovered her hawser. Captain Wiles expressed his doubts that the single non-braided hawser SOUTH BEND proposed giving the ORGERON would be sufficient for its intended use in heavy seas or that SOUTH BEND herself could successfully tow ORGERON and POSEIDON into port. I passed my own doubts on this matter to Mr. Knodle who said he had been under the impression that the SOUTH BEND was a much larger tug. He stated that he would try to find a more suitable tug to assist us.

As the afternoon progressed, the weather conditions began to deteriorate, the winds had increased somewhat and were now coming out of the east southeast. Beginning with our 1600 position, it was clear that we were slowly losing ground to the west. I calculated that in about eight hours, given our present rate of drift toward the coast and shallower water, we would run out of maneuvering room.

At about 1630, while speaking with Mr. Knodle, it was suggested the CHERRY VALLEY might be able to anchor and ride out the storm. SOUTH BEND, at this point in time, was still three miles from our position. After speaking with Mr. Knodle, I conferred with Keystone and the ORGERON and everyone with the decision to anchor. Captain Wiles, in particular, expressed his desire to stay with the CHERRY VALLEY rather than risking a run into port that evening with the SOUTH BEND.

Once the decision to anchor was made, I called the Chief Mate and directed him to make all necessary preparations for dropping our port anchor. We were still on a rough heading of 145 degrees and were taking the east southeasterly winds about two to three points on the port bow with the seas breaking over the main deck. The Chief Mate, Bosun and GVA donned life jackets and started working their way up the starboard side toward the focsle. I maneuvered the Vessel to starboard to provide some protection from the seas but obviously could not alleviate the considerable personal risk these men faced as they worked to get the anchor clear and ready to go.

At about 1645, we experienced a temporary loss of power to the windlass and a loss of radio communications with the Chief Mate on the bow. While we were sorting these problems out, the SOUTH BEND called to say she was departing the area. I told SOUTH BEND that I would prefer that they stay until after we had anchored just incase we might need their assistance. At this point we monitored a "Mayday" call from the SOUTH BEND advising that she was taking on water in her engine room. She proceeded directly downwind to Fort Pierce Inlet and subsequently beached herself to avoid sinking.

Our power and communications problems were quickly solved. I ordered the CHERRY VALLEY’s speed reduced in stages and, at 1703, ordered the port anchor to be let go in approximately 75 feet of water. Ten shots of chain were run out and the brake was set. We began to tend into the seas the ORGERON and POSEIDON swinging astern of us. An anchor watch, consisting of one deck officer, was set on the bridge with orders to check our position regularly to detect any signs that we might be dragging anchor. The AB’s were sent to the fantail to monitor the condition of the mooring lines running out to ORGERON.

Up to this point, we had only two lines made fast to the ORGERON through our stern center line chock. Since these lines had been under continuous heavy strain, I was concerned for their integrity and decided to run two additional lines to the disabled tug. This would bring the total number of lines to four, the maximum number of lines for which there were bitts on the fantail. I discussed this with Captain Wiles, who agreed with my decision, and directed the Chief Mate to make the necessary arrangements.

Carrying two hand-held radios, one to communicate with my own officers, the other to speak with Captain Wiles, I went back to the fantail. The Chief Mate had the deck crew bring additional mooring lines up to the main deck through the hatch leading to the steering gear compartment where the lines were stored.

A degree of creativity was needed to devise a way of getting the mooring lines onto ORGERON. We felt that trying to use the line throwing device to try and get a line to the tug would be risky as it would be a downwind shot. We decided to fasten a ring around the two mooring lines and use it to guide a life jacket, secured with a shot line from the line throwing device, that would drift with the wind and sea to the bow of ORGERON.

The life jacket was dropped over the fantail and began to drift, guided along the two mooring lines, toward ORGERON. However, the movement of the two mooring lines, bouncing up and down in the heavy seas, put too great a strain on the ring that had been looped around the mooring lines and caused it to part. The life jacket consequently drifted wide of the ORGERON, out of reach of her crew. After the ring had parted, one of the two mooring lines, then in place, chafed through and parted where it rode over ORGERON’s bow. This left only one line, under extreme strain, holding the ORGERON and POSEIDON to the CHERRY VALLEY.

Upon seeing the line part, Captain Wiles immediately started the starboard engine and engaged it to ease the strain on the line. He also directed one of his crew to slowly pay out the tow wire to also help ease the strain.

We hauled the life jacket back onboard and then tossed it again over the fantail with the shot line itself riding over the tow line. This technique successfully controlled the direction of the life jacket’s drift until it was recovered by the tug’s crew. A messenger was tied to the shot line and hauled back aboard the CHERRY VALLEY. By 2045, three additional lines had been passed to the ORGERON, bringing the number of lines to four.

The remainder of November 15 passed without further incident. The mates standing anchor watch on the bridge were directed to make hourly rounds of the fantail while a pair of AB’s on the fantail rotated monitoring the lead, strain and condition of the lines to the tug. Grease was to be applied to the lines every 15 minutes and all the lines were to be surged one foot every four hours to guard against chafing at the point where they ran through the stern chock.

The next day, November 16, passed uneventfully as we rode securely at anchor with the ORGERON and POSEIDON in tow directly astern of us. Mr. Knodle called early in the morning requesting an update on the weather and our overall situation. The weather was still quite bad, perhaps worse than the day before with continued high seas and strong winds. Frequent heavy rain squalls, with winds gusting up to 60 to 65 knots, were sweeping through the area as were occasional water spouts. Visibility was severely reduced during the squalls, and, at times, the heavy rain even obscured our own bow from view.

Mr. Knodle advised us that he had been successful in contracting the services of another tug, larger than the SOUTH BEND, which was underway for our position as we spoke. He stated that he was also trying to arrange for the assistance of a smaller tug from Port Canaveral or Fort Pierce but that its master was reluctant to leave port under the existing weather conditions.

Sometime later that morning I was contacted by the master of the 1200 horsepower tug OCEAN WIND, calling from Port Canaveral. I presumed this was the second tug Mr. Knodle was trying to hire since her master stated he would try to help us if our mooring lines parted but would otherwise remain in port until the severe weather conditions moderated.

At about midday, I received a call from Moran Towing regarding the DOROTHY MORAN that had been contracted by NASA to assist us. The DOROTHY MORAN was en route to Port Canaveral, where she was expected to arrive by 1730. At Port Canaveral, the tug would pick up three NASA representatives who would be placed onboard the POSEIDON to assess the condition of the fuel cell and to assist in transferring the tow lines to the DOROTHY MORAN. If conditions permitted, the DOROTHY MORAN was to take both the ORGERON and POSEIDON to Port Canaveral. If the then existing conditions persisted, she would bring the POSEIDON into Fort Pierce and later return to take ORGERON under tow. Her earliest time of arrival was given to us as 2200 that evening.

By 1700, the weather had begun to moderate. The wind had shifted and was now coming from the northwest at 25 to 30 knots. Sea conditions had also improved but remained rough enough to delay the DOROTHY MORAN’s anticipated arrival by about 2 ½ hours.

DOROTHY MORAN finally arrived on the scene at 0050 on November 17 and began to assess the feasibility of placing the NASA representatives onboard the POSEIDON and attempting to transfer her tow that night. After conferring with Captain Wiles and the DOROTHY MORAN’s master, it was mutually agreed that, given the darkness and existing wind and sea conditions, it would have been too dangerous to attempt anything that night. Once this decision was made, the DOROTHY MORAN proceeded into Fort Pierce to spend the night waiting further improvements in the weather.

I awoke early on November 17 and went up to the pilot house at 0630. By this time, the weather conditions had markedly improved with the winds now coming from the west northwest at 25 knots. By 0900, the winds were down to 15 to 20 knots and the seas were three to 4 feet.

At about 0700 I had my first conversation with the DOROTHY MORAN’s master. Apparently a decision had been made that the DOROTHY MORAN would take over the towing of POSEIDON to Port Canaveral. OCEAN WIND, the tug that had contacted us the day before, would join the operation by towing the ORGERON into Fort Pierce.

Both tugs got underway from Fort Pierce about 0800 and arrived on the scene an hour later. Upon her arrival, DOROTHY MORAN approached POSEIDON and put three NASA representatives onboard the barge. At about 0950, we overheard one of the NASA representatives asking the DOROTHY MORAN to call NASA in Washington, D.C. with a preliminary report that the fuel cell was safe and had not suffered any readily apparent damage. They also stated that the condition of the anchor windlass onboard POSEIDON was such that it was not possible to drop the barge’s anchor.

By 1000, all preparations were completed to enable us to start to transfer the ORGERON and POSEIDON to the two tugs. The OCEAN WIND put up a line to the POSEIDON to act as a break as the ORGERON winched in the barge. Once the barge was brought up to the pennant the DOROTHY MORAN’s tow wire was shackled in and at 1030 the DOROTHY MORAN began towing the POSEIDON to Port Canaveral.

Once the POSEIDON was clear, the OCEAN WIND was able to get a tow line made fast to the bow of ORGERON. When this was completed the last of our mooring lines was cut by the crew of the ORGERON and at 1100 she was towed into Fort Pierce. We made preparations to get underway and resume our normal activity of carrying oil, and after being released by the Coast Guard, left the anchorage at 1200.

B. Lessons Learned

Since this rescue I have often been asked, would you do it again? My answer is a qualified yes. I would certainly respond to the distress call and look at the situation and decide if the risk were justified. One of the reasons for responding was that if I were in the ORGERON’s position, I would hope that someone would come and try and assist my vessel.

NASA, Keystone and the Coast Guard offered lots of encouragement during the two and a half days we were involved with the ORGERON, but little in the way of advice or instructions as to how to perform the task. The NASA Port Captain, Bill Knodle, provided the most useful information and advice because he knew the vessel in distress, had an extensive maritime background and was removed from the scene. During our many phone calls he was able to help me filter out the pertinent information and offer suggestions. If a Salvage Master is not on the scene, having one available for the Captain to talk with would be a great asset.

In a situation such as this, shiphandling experience is extremely important. I was fortunate to have some piloting experience prior to this rescue and was comfortable handling this size vessel. Many of the masters I meet today in my role as a ship pilot have very little knowledge of how their vessels handle or what they can do with them. I would strongly recommend that all masters go through one of the manned models simulation courses to increase their knowledge of shiphandling.

I worked with many of the crew aboard the CHERRY VALLEY when I had sailed as Chief Mate and this helped me know what the crew was capable of doing and they were familiar with how I approached different situations. This experience together, and having a common language, were crucial in responding to any emergency situation aboard the vessel.

Before this rescue I would never have believed that a loaded tanker could rescue a tug and barge in fifty knot winds and twenty foot seas close to shoal water. I started the rescue by answering a distress call, and at each point along the way asked, can we do this safely? I set boundaries that we would not exceed and approached the operation one step at a time.

V. Conclusion

It seems vessel owners/operators would be well served by having contingency plans that address the operational and legal aspects of situations where their vessels may find themselves in the position of salvor, as well as salvee.