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Roberts, et al. v. Williamson, et al.,

On September 15, 1996, Baby Williamson was born at Laird Memorial Hospital. Allegedly as a result of medical malpractice, the child suffered permanent mental and physical injuries which will require life-long medical treatment. The child’s parents sued the hospital and various physicians alleging medical malpractice and seeking damages for loss of filial consortium and other injuries. A guardian ad litem was appointed by the trial court.

Before trial, all parties except for Dr. Roberts and one other physician settled for a total of $468,750.00. The jury found that Dr. Roberts was 15% responsible for the child’s injuries, that the other physician was responsible for 0% of the injuries, and that the settling parties were responsible for 85% of the injuries. The jury awarded $3,010, 001.00 in damages including $75,001.00 to the parents for past and future loss of filial consortium. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict against Dr. Roberts ordering her to pay 15% of the entire award with no deduction for the settlements and awarding a guardian ad litem fee of $21,405.69 to be divided evenly between Dr. Roberts and the plaintiffs.

After an extensive review of the jurisprudential history of loss of consortium claims in Texas courts, the Texas Supreme Court declined to extend a claim for loss of consortium to parents of children who have been seriously injured. The primary basis for the court’s holding is that sound public policy requires an end at some point to consequential damages that flow from a single negligent act. The court also performed a cost benefit analysis of recognizing a new cause of action and the accompanying expansion of duty. Noting that the fundamental purposes of the tort system are to deter wrongful conduct, shift losses to responsible parties, and fairly compensate deserving victims, the court stated that recognition of an additional layer of liability to the parent clearly shifts the loss but that recognition of such a claim does not necessarily produce a corresponding benefit in the form of deterrence or fair compensation. It is clear, however, that recognition of such a claim would foster further uncertainty and widen the divergence in recoveries among similarly situated victims.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in upholding of the trial court’s admission of testimony of the plaintiff’s expert. Dr. Roberts challenged this expert’s qualifications to opine regarding the nature and effect of the child’s neurological injuries. The court noted that the testifying physician, Dr. McGehee, was a board certified pediatrician holding certifications in pediatric advanced life support and advanced trauma life support serving in various staff positions. He had also studied the effects of pediatric neurological injuries and had extensive experience advising parents about the effects of those injuries. Thus, although Dr. McGehee was not a neurologist, the record reflects that he had experience and expertise regarding the specific causes and effects of the child’s injuries. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting his testimony.

The Supreme Court also upheld the trial court’s award of 15% of proportionate responsibility to Dr. Roberts without a deduction for the settlement entered into by the other parties. The Supreme Court analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 33.12 and 33.013 noting that § 33.013(a) specifically pertained to defendants who, like Dr. Roberts, are not jointly and severally liable. Because Dr. Roberts was a severally liable defendant, the trial court acted correctly in multiplying the damages found by the trier of fact by the defendant’s percentage of responsibility.

Finally, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s division of the guardian ad litem fee amongst the parties. Finding that the trial court failed to state good cause on the record for taxing part of the court costs against the plaintiffs, the successful party, the Supreme Court held that doing so was an abuse of discretion.